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International Law & Rights-Based
Remedies in the Israel-Palestine Conflict:
Settlements
By ASLI U BALI*
I have been asked to participate as a discussant on the issue of
Israeli settlements and to consider what alternative mechanisms for
conflict resolution and creative rights-based remedies might be
elaborated from an international law perspective in the context of
Israel-Palestine. In light of Michael Lynk's excellent review of the
history of Israeli settlement policy provided by the principal paper
submitted for this panel,' I have opted to focus on recent
developments and set those developments against the international
law framework governing the conflict. I hope that this approach
might provide some context to consider Michael Lynk's careful
discussion of the evolution of Israeli settlements and their role in
undermining any peace process envisioning a two-state solution.
First, I offer a brief overview of developments related to the current
Israeli unilateral disengagement plan. Next, I present a very rough
sketch of the by-now familiar international law framework governing
Israeli settlement practices. Finally, I suggest very briefly one avenue
for taking a rights-based approach to resolving the conflict over
settlements.

*The author is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton, where
her dissertation focuses on questions of international relations and international law.
She is also a graduate of the Yale Law School and an attorney in private practice in
New York.
1. For another interesting review of that history, from 1967, through Menachem
Begin's early phase of settlement in the first decade of the occupation, through Ariel
Sharon's 1977 plan to settle two million Jewish settlers in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, and the Oslo Agreements, see generally FOUNDATION FOR MIDDLE EAST
PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: A
GUIDE (Mar. 2002), available at <http://www.fmep.org/reports/2002/sr02O3.html>.
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Israel's Unilateral Disengagement Plan and Israeli Settlement
Activity in the West Bank and Gaza.
Israeli settlements have recently returned to the headlines of
American newspapers as a hot topic of political debate due to a
number of recent developments. First, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon announced a new plan for an Israeli evacuation from the
Gaza Strip, as part of his "disengagement" strategy for the resolution
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the unilateral imposition of
Israeli terms on the Palestinians. The announcement of the Gaza
withdrawal plan was followed by a visit by Prime Minister Sharon to
the United States, which in turn yielded a letter of assurance from
U.S. President George W. Bush, endorsing the main outline of
Sharon's plan. Controversially, this endorsement included certain
shifts in U.S. policy that the Israelis had sought in exchange for their
unilateral offer to evacuate the settlements in Gaza. Notably, no
effort was made to include any Palestinian interlocutor as part of this
negotiation over the terms of a potential Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza.
The position adopted by President Bush in response to the
Sharon plan represents a departure not only from the prior U.S.
position on Israel-Palestine, but also from American support for the
fundamental principle ordering the international peace and security
framework adopted under the U.N. charter. That ordering principle
- namely, the illegitimacy of the annexation of territory through force
of arms - has been the chief mechanism for stabilizing the
international system for over half a century. The consequences of the
apparent abandonment of that principle by the Bush administration
remain to be seen.
As already noted, the Israelis were successful in having their
unilateral position endorsed by the Bush administration, representing
a departure from past American policy and the American
commitment to the "Road Map," which had heretofore been the
definitive international framework for peace negotiations between
the Israelis and Palestinians after the collapse of the Oslo process. 2 In
2. The Bush administration issued a delayed reaction to Palestinian and Arab
outrage at shifts in U.S. policy. In several statements, including an interview on alHurra, the U.S.-run Arabic-language satellite television channel, and in an interview
in al-Ahram, an Egyptian newspaper, President Bush sought to characterize his
position as not representing a significant departure from prior American policy. In
particular, he suggested that the question of the right of return of Palestinian
refugees and the border between Israel and a future Palestinian state remain so-
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the joint press conference held by Bush and Sharon, as well as in the
content of the letter of assurances from the United States to Israel,
the following explicit departures from U.S. policy were secured by the
Israelis:
Existing Settlements: The United States no longer regards a full
withdrawal by Israel to its pre-1967 borders as realistic as a result of
"new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli
population centers [sic]" in the West Bank (in contrast to the
recognition of existing settlements as illegal and an obstacle to peace
under the Road Map);3 and
Right of Return: The United States no longer treats the right of
return of Palestinian refugees as an issue to be resolved in the final
status negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians (as is
required under the Road Map), but rather takes the position that a
"just, fair and realistic" solution for the Palestinian refugees would be
for them to settle in a future Palestinian state rather than returning to
the homes from which they were expelled in Israel.'
Further to these explicit policy shifts, additional issues were
either not addressed or inadequately addressed, which, in either case,
may operate effectively as a further endorsement of the Israeli
position on such issues. These issues include the following:
Status of the Israeli "Security Wall": While President Bush
reaffirmed his view that the barrier the Israelis are constructing in the
West Bank should be a temporary security measure rather than the
basis of a permanent political boundary, the failure of the United
States to reiterate demands for a specific alteration of the route of the
Wall to follow the Green Line may amount to an endorsement of the
current Israeli trajectory, and the attendant strategy of annexing West
Bank lands through the construction of the Wall. This annexation
called "final status" issues to be negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians, rather
than being prejudged by the United States. See Ibrahim Nafie, "I'm Sorry", ALAHRAM
WEEKLY
ONLINE
(May
8,
2004),
available
at
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2004/689/fr4.htm>.
Whether any of these
statements amount to a readjustment of the U.S. position and a return to the Road
Map model is ambiguous at best.
3. Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to Ariel Sharon,
Israeli
Prime
Minister
(Apr.
14,
2004),
available
at
<http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicaldocuments/260.shtml>.
4. Id. (stating that "an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to
the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be
found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian
refugees there, rather than in Israel").
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may be part of the wider Israeli strategy to preserve and permanently
retain major settlement blocs in the West Bank.
On-going Settlement Activity: The United States was silent on the
statement in Ariel Sharon's letter to President Bush that the Israelis
need only commit to "limitations on the growth of settlements" rather
than an actual freeze on settlement activities (as required under the
Road Map);5
Palestinian Population in the West Bank: If the Bush
administration's endorsement of the Israeli position extends to all of
the settlement blocs that Israeli Prime Minister Sharon has publicly
stated that he plans to retain,6 the Palestinians in the West Bank will
likely end up enclosed into over a dozen small, noncontiguous entities
divided by at least six large Israeli settlement blocs. This would not
only cut West Bank Palestinians off from Jerusalem, but also major
West Bank towns and cities would be isolated and cut off from one
another.
Status of Jerusalem:If the Israelis were permitted to permanently
annex the major settlement blocs around Jerusalem, any further
negotiation on the status of Jerusalem would likely be preempted.
The West Bank would effectively be cut off from Jerusalem
completely by the three largest Israeli settlement blocs surrounding
Jerusalem: Maale Adumim, Givat Zeev and Gush Etzion (or the
Etzion bloc).
Borders and Security Control in Gaza: There is no prospect in
Sharon's unilateral evacuation plan, nor was there a requirement
imposed by the Bush administration, for Palestinian control of the
land or sea borders of Gaza and Gazan airspace. Indeed, the official
description of the Disengagement Plan provided by the Israeli Prime
Minister's Office, includes the following explicit reference to Gazan

5. Letter from Ariel Sharon, Israeli Prime Minister, to George W. Bush,
President of the United States (Apr. 2004) (stating that "we are fully aware of the
responsibilities facing the State of Israel. These include limitations on the growth of
at
available
settlements.. ."),
<http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicaldocuments/260.shtml>.
6. In his address to members of the Knesset summarizing his accomplishments
in his trip to the United States, Ariel Sharon noted that "the United States believes
that the large settlement blocs will remain under Israeli control in every
arrangement" and that the purpose of his Disengagement Plan was to "preserve the
large Israeli settlement blocs under Israeli control forever." See Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon, Speech to the Knesset on His Latest Visit to the United States
at
available
2004),
22,
(Apr.
Plan
Disengagement
the
and
<http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicalspeeches/263.shtml>.
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boundaries, airspace and resources:
Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the
Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority over
Gazan air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in
the sea off the coast of Gaza.... [E]xisting arrangements relating
to water.. .shall remain in force.7
Under these circumstances, over 1.5 million Palestinians living in
Gaza following an Israeli withdrawal would be living on a small strip
of land with no means to travel in or out of the territory, no control
over the movement of goods in or out of Gaza, and no means to
control or prevent Israeli incursions or Israeli appropriation of
resources, including water.
Potential for a Viable Palestinian State: Israeli Prime Minister
Sharon has repeatedly publicly stated that his unilateral plan entails
delaying the emergence of any future Palestinian state, potentially
indefinitely. 8 Sharon has specifically described the plan as a "deadly
blow to Palestinians." 9 While President Bush spoke at his joint press
conference with Sharon of his vision of a "viable, contiguous,
sovereign and independent" Palestinian state, he did not address
Sharon's contention that no such state could emerge as part of his
unilateral plan. In more recent comments, President Bush has
admitted that he no longer views 2005 - the deadline he set for the
creation of a Palestinian state in the summer of 2002 - as realistic. °
No alternative timeframe has been suggested by the American
administration, and their acquiescence to the unilateral imposition of
terms by the Israelis strongly suggests that Sharon's vision of a nonsovereign Palestinian entity will prevail over Bush's professed
commitment to the eventual emergence of a Palestinian state.
With respect to settlements, the political implications of the shift
7. Israeli Prime Minister's Office, The Disengagement Plan: General Outline, §§
3,
8
(Apr.
18,
2004),
available
at
<http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicaldocuments/264.shtml>.
8. "'In the unilateral plan, there is no Palestinian state. This situation could
continue for many years,' Sharon told [the Israeli daily] Yediot Ahronot." Karin
Laub, No Palestinian State for Years, Says Sharon, INDEPENDENT (UK) (April 5,
2004), at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle-east/story.jsp?story=508585.
See also ASSOCIATED PRESS, PalestinianState Years Away, Sharon Says, April 5, 2004
("Palestinians might not get a state for many years as a result of Israel's unilateral
'disengagement' plan ...
Sharon said.").
9. Laub, supra note 8 ("Sharon said the withdrawal plan was a 'deadly blow' to
the Palestinians and that he would not coordinate with them.").
10. Nafie, supra note 2.
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in the U.S. position could not be more stark. The political terms for
negotiating a resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict have now
shifted so much further in favor of an Israeli position, that there may
be no political obstacle left to the Israelis imposing their preferences
on the Palestinians by annexing the territory they wish to retain in the
West Bank, including Jerusalem, and imprisoning the Palestinian
population of the West Bank and Gaza in isolated cantons without
control over their borders and resources or the ability to travel
between or outside of Palestinian entities. Further, should such terms
be imposed as the "final" resolution of the conflict between
Palestinians and Israelis, Israel would likely deny all of its obligations
as an occupier with respect to the well-being of the Palestinian
population, exposing Palestinians in isolated cantons to a potential
humanitarian catastrophe. In fine, the shift in U.S. policy further
widens the already enormous gulf between the requirements of
international law regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict and the
political realities whereby those requirements are systematically
violated with impunity.
Needless to say, the political implications of the shift in U.S.
position have, at present, no bearing on the normative content of the
international law framework for the Israel-Palestine conflict." The
principle that the Israeli annexation of land by force and the
subsequent Israeli colonization of the occupied West Bank and Gaza
Strip are illegal remains the governing international law framework as
set forth in U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, regardless
of the shift in American policy. Israel's obligations as a belligerent
occupier under the Fourth Geneva Convention remain applicable to
Israeli conduct in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, whether or
not so recognized as a de jure matter by either the Israelis or the
Americans. 2 Similarly, the commission of serious violations of

11. Should the Americans or the Israelis succeed in gaining wider acceptance of
their position regarding Israeli obligations under international law, one could imagine
that even the international legal framework could be shifted, as it was during the
Oslo process. However, in light of the invocation of UN Security Council resolutions
242 and 338 as the basis of the Road Map framework, the international legal
framework remains unchanged at present. U.N. News Centre, A Performance-Based
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-PalestinianConflict, at
<http://www.un.org/media/main/roadmap122002.html>.
12. Indeed, even the United States has historically acknowledged the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, though the Bush administration's departure from traditional U.S. policy
with respect to the conflict may signal a retreat from this position as well.

2005] International Law & Rights-Based Remedies in the Israel-Palestine Conflict:

393

international humanitarian law as well as grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions by successive Israeli governments in their
treatment of Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories cannot be excused unilaterally by the United States nor
bilaterally between the U.S. and Israel.
Accordingly, the primary political and academic debates
surrounding Israeli settlements do not concern the application of
international law to Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and
Gaza, but rather the relevance of international law in light of the
impracticability of enforcing norms that are continually violated or
disregarded by the Israelis with the tacit consent or explicit
endorsement of the United States. Indeed, the illegality of Israeli
settlements is the subject of a broad consensus among practitioners
and scholars of international law (other than those employed by the
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. Department of Defense one should note that even the U.S. Department of State has, until
recently, conceded the illegality of the settlements - and certain
Israeli or pro-Israeli research institutes or think-tanks). The real
relevance of international law may lie not in determining the legality
of Israeli conduct but elsewhere: in providing creative alternatives for
evacuating the settlements, should the political climate for
negotiation ever prove amenable to an international law-based
approach to resolving the conflict. With this possibility in mind, let us
briefly consider the international law framework applicable to Israeli
settlements before turning our attention to such potential remedies.
International Legal Standards Concerning Settlements
A. International Humanitarian Law and Belligerent Occupation

The basic international law framework governing Israeli
settlement activities is the customary international law binding on a
belligerent occupier. Israel acquired the West Bank and Gaza Strip
through resort to armed conflict during the 1967 war and its retention
of those territories has constituted a belligerent occupation for the
last 37 years. The principal codification of the international law
governing belligerent occupation is the Fourth Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (August
12, 1949) (Geneva IV). In particular, Section III of Geneva IV sets
the rules applicable to Occupied Territories. Section III contains
Article 49, the most relevant portion of which reads as follows:
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Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not,
are prohibited, regardless of their motive .... THE OCCUPYING
POWER SHALL NOT DEPORT OR TRANSFER PARTS OF ITS OWN
CIVILIAN POPULATION INTO THE TERRITORY IT OCCUPIES.

(Emphasisadded.)

Clearly, by the terms of Article 49 of Geneva IV, the Israeli
government is in violation of international law, both as a result of
transferring Israeli citizens to settlements built in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (OPTs), and in forcibly transferring
Other
Palestinians from one part of the OPTs to another. 3
codifications of the customary international law norms governing
belligerent occupation contained in the 1907 Hague Regulations,
prohibit the confiscation of lands (Article 46) and require the
protection of Palestinian public and private property by the
occupying power (Article 55).4

In addition to this general international humanitarian law
framework for belligerent occupation, there are specific obligations
applicable to the Israeli government in its occupation of the
Palestinian territories conquered in 1967 that issued either through
resolutions of the U.N. Security Council, or through the undertakings
of various Israeli governments in the context of the Oslo Accords and
the more recent "Road Map."
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
Beginning with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242
(November 22, 1967) calling for an end to the Israeli occupation of
lands acquired by force, there have been at least four additional
13. This prohibition might equally apply to the forcible transfer of Palestinians
from their lands in the West Bank to other parts of the West Bank as a result of
settlement, by-pass road, and Wall construction as it does to the more explicit forms
of transfer whereby the Israeli government has begun deporting West Bank residents
to Gaza as punishment for alleged attacks against Israelis committed by their

relatives. See, e.g., The Palestine Chronicle Weekly Journal, Israel Deports
at
2004),
21,
(Feb.
Crime'
'War
in
Palestinians
3 8 16
1 >.
<http://www.palestinechronicle.com/story.php?sid=200402210802
14. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) also sets forth a
recent reaffirmation that "the transfer directly or indirectly by the Occupying Power
of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" constitutes a war
crime. See Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(viii), United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (1998).
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Security Council resolutions calling for an end to occupation,
affirming and then reaffirming the illegality of Israeli settlements, and
recalling Israeli obligations towards the Palestinian civilian
population as a belligerent occupier, including the obligations to
respect and protect the public and private property of Palestinians
and to refrain from land and property confiscations. Had the United
States not effectively deployed its veto power, scores of other draft
resolutions reaffirming these obligations and the illegality of the
settlements would also have joined the list of resolutions on this
issue. 5 The Israeli government remains in violation of all of these
Security Council resolutions (and a considerable number of
additional resolutions on the recognition of Palestinian rights, use of
disproportionate force in the occupied territories, and attempted
annexation of Jerusalem).
Israeli Undertakings to "Freeze" Settlement Activities: Oslo &
Beyond
The Israeli government entered into a series of undertakings by
signing the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements and the 1995 Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip (i.e., the Oslo Accords). 6 While the
question of existing settlements was deferred until "final status" talks,
initially scheduled to commence in 1996, these preliminary Oslo
Accords did specify an Israeli obligation not to engage in unilateral
measures that would "alter" the status of the West Bank and Gaza.
This was widely understood to mean that the Israeli government had
committed itself to a "settlement freeze," whereby additional
settlement activity would be prohibited during the course of the
"peace process."
However, the Israeli government not only
continued but actually accelerated settlement expansion during the
Oslo period, leading to a doubling of the settler population in the
West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip and
15. U.N. Security Council resolutions on the illegality of the settlements include:
S.C. Res. 446, U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., 2134th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (1979); S.C.
Res. 452, U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., 2159th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/452 (1979); S.C. Res.
465, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2203d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/465 (1980); S.C. Res. 478,
U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2245th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (1980).
16. The full text of all United Nations documents as well as the Oslo Accords, the
Road Map, Middle East Quartet communiqu6s, civil society peace initiatives such as
the Geneva Accords of 2003 and the Bush-Sharon Letters are all available at
<http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicaldocuments.shtml>.
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massive additional confiscation of Palestinian lands, both to enable
the physical expansion of settlements and to construct an elaborate
network of settler-only "by-pass roads" to connect Israeli settlements
to Israel. The unfortunate effect of the Oslo Accords, then, was to
reclassify Israeli settlements as subject to negotiation, rather than
simply illegal, while imposing no enforceable obligation on the
Israelis to freeze the growth of their settlement activities, let alone
dismantle existing settlements. Nonetheless, neither the Oslo Accord
framework nor the collapse of the Oslo process altered the basic
illegality of Israeli settlements constructed on occupied Palestinian
lands.
With the collapse of the Oslo process, the American government
sent a commission, headed by George Mitchell, to study the causes of
the Palestinian intifada of 2000 and to make recommendations
designed to establish a new foundation for resolving the conflict. One
of the chief recommendations in the Mitchell Report was that the
Israeli settlements remained a significant obstacle to any peace
process and that the Israeli government should commit to a "total and
immediate freeze of all settlement activities" as a confidence-building
measure.
On May 16, 2001, the Palestine National Authority
accepted the Mitchell Report.
By contrast, several of the
recommendations in the report, and particularly the recommendation
of a settlement freeze, were rejected by the Israeli government.
Despite the non-implementation of the Mitchell Report
recommendations, several of those recommendations, including the
requirement of an Israeli settlement freeze, were also incorporated
into Phase I of the Road Map. 7
There is thus no question that under international law, continued
Israeli settlement activity is unequivocally illegal. What remains is to
determine what remedies, if any, are available under international
law for the Palestinians to enforce prohibitions on maintaining and
expanding Israeli settlements, to require the evacuation of existing
settlements, and to be compensated for the confiscation of land and
property, the destruction of property, and the deportation of
17. Under the heading of Phase I, the last topic covered is "Settlement"
and the text of the Road Map reads as follows: "GOI immediately
dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001. Consistent with the
Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of
settlements)." Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, A Performance-Based Roadmap
to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (April 30,
2003), available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>.
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Palestinian civilians that have been a consequence of ongoing Israeli
settlement activity.
Rights-Based Remedies: Compensation
Human rights-based approaches to the Israel-Palestine conflict
tend to focus on the widespread and egregious human rights
violations committed by Israeli forces in the OPTs, including
indiscriminate and excessive use of force, deliberate attacks on
civilians, arbitrary detention, torture, collective punishment,
assassinations, restrictions on free movement, violations of the rights
of children, extra-judicial killing of protected persons, as well as
innumerable violations of Palestinians' economic and social rights,
including rights as basic as the right to food, medical treatment and
supplies, and shelter. The most obvious remedies for these violations
are, first, an immediate cessation of all such violations, and second,
compensation for the victims of such rights violations and their
families.
Unfortunately, far less attention is devoted in the
international law literature to studying remedies for these rights
violations than to establishing the nature of Israeli obligations under
international law and the extent of their violation. The emphasis of
this conference series on remedies from a rights-based perspective is
especially timely and appropriate in this context.
The foregoing sections of this paper have set forth wellestablished facts relating to Israeli settlement practices, recent
developments in the Israeli position and U.S. policies relative to the
occupation of Palestinian lands and the applicable international law
framework. What remains is to consider the main focus of this
conference, namely the existing rights-based remedies under
international law as mechanisms for conflict resolution.
One
potential mechanism for applying a rights-based approach to the
question of Israeli settlements - compensation - will be considered
here.
The problem of Israeli settlement activities as such is rarely
included in the list of human rights violations, though Israelis
settlements are clearly implicated in a wide array of human rights
violations including: the war crime of transferring the civilian
population of the Occupied Power to the territories it occupies, the
war crime of transferring the Palestinian civilian population from
their land to other parts of the territory, expropriation and
confiscation of Palestinian private property, home demolition,
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massive restrictions on freedom of movement of Palestinians,
establishment of an apartheid system of discriminatory housing, road
networks and civil infrastructure through settlement construction, and
so forth. Understanding Israeli settlement activity in terms of the
associated human rights violations committed against civilian
Palestinians helps to clarify the appropriate remedies for continued
colonization of Palestinian lands under international law. As already
suggested, the first remedy would be a total and complete injunction
on any continuation of these violations, involving not only a complete
freeze on continuing Israeli settlement activities, but also an
immediate abolition of the apartheid policies associated with
settlements, such as the exclusion of Palestinians from the housing
and bypass-road networks developed for the settlers and the exclusive
appropriation of civil infrastructure and resources for use by Israeli
settlers. The second component of the remedy for rights violations
associated with Israeli settlement activities is compensation to
Palestinians, at a minimum, for: expropriation, destruction of
property, loss of use of lands and property and associated loss of
income, and economic costs resulting from restrictions on the
freedom of movement of Palestinians as a direct result of settlements
and bypass roads.
But how are rights-based compensation claims formulated and
what remedial mechanisms are available in international law to
determine the appropriate level of compensation?
To date, rights-based approaches to remedies in the context of
Israel-Palestine have been elaborated principally with respect to the
Palestinian refugee issue. Palestinians have long viewed the question
of the rights of displaced Palestinians in terms of the "right of return."
In fact, the international law framework governing the rights of
Palestinian refugees includes at least three potential rights-based
remedies": repatriation (i.e., what is commonly referred to as the
18. The constraints of this discussion do not permit a full elaboration of the
international law framework for the rights of Palestinian refugees. Suffice it to note
that they are based in four separate but overlapping sources of law: the law of
nationality in the case of state succession; humanitarian law (the Geneva
Conventions and their Protocols); human rights law (including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights); and international conventions and customary international law governing
the treatment of refugees (including the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees).
In addition to this general framework, U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 194, particularly paragraph 11, subparagraph 1, G.A. Res. 194 (III), U.N.
Doc A/RES/194 (III) (1948), establishes a specific framework governing the
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"right of return"); resettlement (i.e., relocation of displaced persons
to areas outside of the territories from which they were displaced);
and compensation (i.e., the satisfaction of individual and collective
Palestinian claims for restitution for the territory and property that
was forcibly seized or destroyed). 9 There has not been an equally
well-articulated statement of a rights-based approach to developing
remedies for the issue of Israeli settlements. In the following
discussion, we will suggest an approach to compensation in the
context of the Israeli settlement issue and then ask whether there may
be a link between compensation rights that arise as a result of the
right of Palestinian refugees to return to the lands from which they
were expelled and the Israeli obligation to evacuate settlements
constructed in the West Bank and Gaza.
A. Rights-Based Remedies and Compensation Claims
The most basic approach to understanding rights-based remedies
in the context of Israeli settlements is by reference to compensation
and restitution requirements applicable to cases of expropriation.
There are several relevant models in international law, including the
mechanisms that were put in place to protect the rights of private
property owners following the Communist expropriations of the
1940s as well as responses to the wave of nationalization of domestic
industries and resources in the early phase of decolonization.
American lawyers have devoted considerable energy to elaborating
compensation mechanisms to protect the rights of American citizens
whose properties were nationalized in Cuba in July 1960. Similarly,
international lawyers have been interested since the end of the Cold
War in developing restitution and compensation mechanisms for
application in Eastern Europe for the expropriations that took place

implementation of the right of displaced Palestinians to return to their homes or be
compensated for the loss of their property. For a detailed discussion of the
international law framework governing the rights of Palestinian refugees, see GAIL J.
BOLING, PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN: AN INTERNATIONAL

LAW ANALYSIS (BADIL Resource Center for Residency and Refugee Rights, 2001),
available at <http://www.badil.org/Publications/Legal-Papers/LPapers.htm>.
19. We are fortunate to have Michael Lynk serving as a presenter, since he is the
author of one of the most detailed statements on the right to compensation in
international law in the context of the remedies available to Palestinian refugees.
Michael Lynk, The Right to Compensation in InternationalLaw and the Displaced
2001), at
Palestinians, PALESTINIAN REFUGEE RESEARCH NET (Jan.
<http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/new-prrn/research/papersilynk.htm> (visited, Oct.

2, 2004).
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Studies of compensation and

restitution rights in these contexts may furnish useful insights for
application to the Palestinian case.
Important precedents have also been established in different

international, regional and domestic courts with respect to
expropriation and relevant remedies. One recent precedent in the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) drew considerable
attention from those interested in remedying Palestinian
expropriations.

In Loizidou v. Turkey, the ECHR invalidated

Turkey's expropriation of the lands of Greek Cypriots who had left
their properties during the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island. The
court held that the plaintiff retained legal title to her land and
property and that Turkey not only had to return Loizidou's property,
but also compensate her for interference with her right to full

enjoyment of her property.21
Another interesting example,
particularly in considering compensation mechanisms to remedy
expropriations associated with Israeli settlements, are certain court

cases in Israel related to the expropriation of lands within the
boundaries of Jerusalem. Specifically, Jewish land agencies sued the

Israeli government over what they claimed was the expropriation of
lands to which they had title in Abu Ghoneim/Har Homa. The Israeli
High Court of Justice ultimately awarded the Jewish land

development companies $45,000 per dunam as compensation for the
claimed expropriation.22
20. There are countless references for both of these cases. See generally JOSE M.
SARIEGO & NICHOLAS J. GUTIERREZ, RIGHTING OLD WRONGS: A SURVEY OF
RESTITUTION SCHEMES FOR POSSIBLE APPLICATION TO A DEMOCRATIC CUBA (1989);
and JON ELSTER ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST COMMUNIST SOCIETIES:
REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA (1998) (studying privatization and compensation

schemes in the transitional period of post-communist Eastern Europe).
One
interesting reference is an article applying compensation and restitution mechanisms
developed in the Eastern European context to potential claims in Cuba. G. Douglas
Harper, Restitution of Property in Cuba: Lessons Learned from Eastern Europe, 9
CUBA IN TRANSITION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY
(1999), available at

<http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba9>.
21. For a discussion of the Loizidou case and its applicability to the Palestinian
context, see Arjan El Fassed, Loizidou v. Turkey: A Precedent for Palestinian
Refugees?,
69
INFORMATION
BRIEF
(2001),
available
at
<http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/pubs/20010223ib.html>.
22. For an account of the legal court cases between Jewish land development
agencies and the Government of Israel over the alleged expropriation at Abu
Ghoneim, see Gershon Baskin & Zakaria al-Qaq, Har Homa: A Call for Action,
ISRAEL PALESTINE CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND INFORMATION (1997),
at
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In each of these cases, the focus has been on determining who
the eligible claimants are, whether restitution or compensation is a
more appropriate remedy, and how to calculate the value of claims if
compensation is to be awarded. In the Palestinian case with respect
to expropriation related to settlements in the West Bank and Gaza,
there is an additional question of whether separate individual and
collective claims may be made, as both private and public property in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories were confiscated to construct
Israeli settlements and the infrastructure to support them.
Indemnifying Palestinians for the losses that they have suffered
individually and collectively as a result of Israeli settlement activities
in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza since 1967 will
require detailed attention to the mechanisms and modalities of
calculating and awarding compensation and restitution claims. That
Palestinians suffered significant rights violations as a result of Israeli
settlement activities and related expropriation of Palestinian lands is
well-established in international law, as discussed above. Equally
well-established in international law and equity is that victims of
losses associated with serious violations of international humanitarian
law and expropriations are entitled to compensation or restitution for
those losses, as outlined in this section. However, international law is
considerably less clear on the implementation of remedial measures.
Valuing the extent of Palestinian losses related to Israeli
settlements and designing a framework for compensation is a
complicated undertaking fraught with practical and theoretical
stumbling blocks. In order to frame our discussion of implementing
rights-based remedies in the context of Israeli settlements, let us
simply highlight some of the considerations that would need to be
taken into account in designing a compensation mechanism:
Defining appropriate claimants at individual and collective level:
Will individual claimants have to show direct title to land or property
from which they were expropriated or will residency on such land or
relation to the property owner be sufficient? Who will be a legitimate
claimant on behalf of Palestinians collectively for public lands and
properties that were expropriated or destroyed?
Valuation methods: Will valuation of expropriated or destroyed
property be in accordance with market value or another metric?
How will lost rent and other economic interests in full enjoyment of
property be calculated? What will be the valuation to compensate for
<http://www.ipcri.org/files/har%20homa.html> (visited, Sep. 8, 2004).
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rights violations and the associated suffering independent of the
economic value of the properties in question?
Form of compensation: Will compensation be partially
accomplished by restitution or entirely in the form of indemnification
payments? If restitution, will it be to restore the lands and properties
to the form they were prior to expropriation, damage and destruction
or will another formula be adopted for implementation of restitution
rights?
Procedural mechanisms: Will compensation and restitution be
determined by an international claims commission (modeled on such
precedents as the Iraq-Kuwait Compensation Commission or the
U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal)? What other forms of judicial or political
bodies approved by the parties might administer the process?
International participation: While the obligation to make
compensation and restitution lies entirely with the party that was
unjustly enriched by acts of expropriation and destruction of
Palestinian lands and property, in the context of the extent of
potential compensation claims and the international community's
interest in a fair settlement of claims between the parties, will there
be international participation in the establishment of a compensation
fund, and if so, how will that be accomplished?
This is a very preliminary and rough list of considerations that
would need to be taken into account in designing an appropriate
remedial mechanism for the (property and other) rights violations
associated with Israeli colonization of the West Bank and Gaza. In
the remaining section of this short discussion paper, a specific
proposal related to the civil and residential infrastructure of the
Israeli settlements will be considered.
B. A Modest (Strategic)Proposal:Settlements and Resettlement
To the extent that compensation is a remedial mechanism
recognized under international law it has also been a feature of most
of the peace initiatives in Israel-Palestine of the last two decades.
The outlines of all of the principal blueprints for a resolution to the
Israel-Palestine conflict have at least one feature in common. From
the 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement to the final phases of the Oslo
negotiations (including the outcome of the talks at Taba in December
2000) and the terms of the recent Israeli-Palestinian civil society
initiatives (including the 2002 Nusseibeh-Ayalon Statement of
Principles and the 2003 (Beilin-Abed Rabbo) Geneva Accords, every
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peace initiative has acknowledged that wholesale repatriation of
Palestinian refugees is not politically feasible in the current
international order. Rather, each initiative has stressed the extent to
which the Israeli government may accept its obligation to provide
some compensation to Palestinian refugees, while permitting a

symbolic (and likely very small) number of refugees to return to their
former lands or homes.

With limited hope of repatriation, many

contemporary rights-based approaches to the Palestinian refugee
issue largely depend on the mechanisms of resettlement (often

understood to mean in a future Palestinian state) and compensation.
Given the well-settled international law principle that displaced

persons are entitled to compensation for the lands and property taken
from them where repatriation is denied, one strategic alternative is to
link the compensation rights of Palestinian refugees to the Israeli
obligation to evacuate the settlements.
In this conception, the Israeli government would be required to
evacuate all of the West Bank and Gaza settlements by leaving the
residential and civil infrastructure of the settlements in place while
removing the Israeli settler population.'
The abandoned urban
infrastructure of evacuated settlements might then be used to
partially offset a portion of Israel's obligations to compensate
Palestinian refugees for their confiscated land and property. In this

scenario, those Palestinian refugees willing to resettle in the West
Bank and Gaza would gain title to the buildings and residential
infrastructure of the abandoned settlements, while the collective
Palestinian nation would gain title to the civil infrastructure including water, sewage, electricity and road networks - that support
residential life in those settlements.24
23. The Israeli government (and its international sponsors) might also be
required to compensate Israeli settlers for their evacuation from Palestinian lands,
where such compensation would represent an incentive for the orderly evacuation of
such settlements by Israeli citizens originally dispatched to illegally colonize parts of
the West Bank and Gaza by their own government.
Requiring the Israeli
government to undertake the expense of this compensation, perhaps with
international assistance, is one desirable way to reverse the decades-long perverseincentive system whereby successive Israeli governments have induced their
citizenry, in part through considerable financial incentives, to facilitate ongoing
violations of international law by colonizing Palestinian lands.
24. There was some consideration of such an option with respect to the Gaza
withdrawal proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, quickly dispensed with in
favor of Israel's more common scorched earth policy, evidenced in the earlier Israeli
withdrawals from the Sinai and from South Lebanon. Nevertheless, some might
argue that a remedy involving use of settlement infrastructure to offset some portion
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This clearly would not be a sufficient remedy to satisfy or offset
the full Israeli obligation to compensate those Palestinian refugees
who might so resettle, and it would depend on a willingness of a

significant proportion of the refugees to accept resettlement in a
Further, any implementation of this
future Palestinian state.
approach would require detailed consideration of the eligible
claimants for homes in these settlements and would need to be

complemented by a host of additional forms of compensation for
most claimants. Nonetheless, this suggestion is illustrative of the
possibility of using international law frameworks creatively to

innovate remedial mechanisms in resolving the legally well-settled but
politically intractable issues fueling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

of Israel's compensation obligations with respect to the right of return is really far too
modest of a proposal. I have tried to emphasize that this might only figure as one
part of a multifaceted approach to Israeli recognition of the right of return and the
compensation, repatriation and resettlement obligations associated therewith. To
take an example, however, if Israel were to evacuate Ma'ale Adumim and provide its
housing and infrastructure to returning Palestinian refugees willing to be resettled in
the West Bank, it would effectively be transferring the urban infrastructure of a
sizeable modern city to Palestine. From the perspective of the compensation to
which Palestinians are entitled this may seem modest, but when considered in light of
the arrangements concerning the right of return and the fate of existing settlements
that have been put on the table in bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations from 1993
to January 2001 in Taba, it would represent considerable progress.

